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The identification of vulnerabilities is a continuous
challenge in software projects. This is due to the
evolution of methods that attackers employ as well
as the constant updates to the software, which reveal
additional issues. As a result, new and innovative
approaches for the identification of vulnerable software
are needed. In this paper, we present VULNERLIZER,
which is a novel framework for cross-analysis between
vulnerabilities and software libraries. It uses CVE
(Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures) and software
library data together with clustering algorithms to
generate links between vulnerabilities and libraries. In
addition, the training of the model is conducted in
order to reevaluate the generated associations. This
is achieved by updating the assigned weights. Finally,
the approach is evaluated by making the predictions
using the CVE data from the test set. The results show
a great potential of the approach in predicting future
vulnerable libraries based on an initial input CVE entry
or a software library. The trained model reaches a
prediction accuracy of 75% or higher.
1. Introduction
The number of software-related security incidents
is constantly increasing. One of the reasons behind
this is the large number of vulnerabilities that are
reported daily. Compared to the year 2016, the
number of identified vulnerabilities doubled in each of
the following years [1]. In addition, the discovery
of vulnerable software modules is a challenging task
[2]. In comparison to the traditional techniques, the
security vulnerability prediction (SVP) approaches are
becoming more popular [3]. These approaches construct
models by utilizing machine learning algorithms in
order to identify vulnerable software [4]. Most existing
approaches are based on the identification of vulnerable
code sections according to the historical source code
data. However, the evolution of methods that the
attackers employ as well as the constant updates to the
software makes it difficult to identify security issues [5].
In addition, software vendors do not always disclose the
source code, which makes it challenging to construct
datasets for training the model. As a result, further
innovative approaches are needed.
Docker containers (DCs) are becoming a highly
popular technology that is used for a large variety
of purposes [6]. Moreover, many of the containers
are publicly available online and can be used for
research practices. In addition, they provide a
rich data source from which software library-related
data can be extracted in order to build high-quality
datasets. Coupled with the vulnerability data from
the vulnerability databases, this can be used in SVP
approaches for the purpose of constructing and training
the model. In this paper, a machine learning
approach for a cross-analysis between vulnerabilities
and software libraries is presented. This is incorporated
into the framework called VULNERLIZER, which
in comparison to other existing approaches uses
the data extracted from Docker images (DIs). It
generates a library cohesion graph that includes software
library-related information as well as information on
how the specific libraries are associated to each other.
The approach is automated, extendable, and has a
prediction accuracy of 75% or higher.
The remainder of this paper is structured as
follows: Section 2 examines related work regarding
machine learning and matching approaches used for
vulnerability analysis. Section 3 discusses the datasets
used in the proposed approach. Section 4 presents
the VULNERLIZER, as well as its sub-components.
Section 5 provides an evaluation of the proposed
framework. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper and
provides an outlook on future work.
2. Related Work
In this section, we discuss the related work in the
context of applying machine learning approaches as well
as the matching approaches for vulnerability analysis.
2.1. Machine learning approaches
Harer et al. [7] proposed a data-driven approach
for automated software vulnerability detection using
machine learning. This is achieved by comparing the
methods obtained from a source code and build process
utilizing multiple machine learning techniques. The





results indicated that these techniques can be efficient
for predicting the output of static analysis tools at the
function level. However, the approach is only applicable
to C and C++ programs. Chernis et al. [8] introduced an
approach for detecting vulnerabilities by extracting text
features from functions in C source code. In this regard,
they apply various machine learning classifiers in which
they first extract simple features such as the character
count, if count and entropy. In addition, they extract
complex features such as word n-grams and suffix
trees. The results showed a 74% accuracy rate, which
was achieved using character diversity as the baseline
requirement. Sabottke et al. [9] conducted a quantitative
and qualitative analysis of vulnerability information
found on Twitter. Furthermore, they considered the
vulnerability data available in public databases. In order
to analyze the collected data, Sabottke et al. applied
support vector machine classifiers. As a result, they
were able to identify more vulnerabilities exploited in
the real-world than the ones for which proof-of-concept
is available. This resulted in a lower false-positive
detection rate compared to the CVSS-based detectors.
Movahedi et al. [10] clustered vulnerabilities according
to text information available within their own records.
In doing so, they simulated a mean value function by
relaxing the monotonic intensity function assumption.
The approach was applied to multiple operating systems
(OSs) and web browsers. The results showed that
the clustering approaches perform better and provide
more accurate results compared to the non-clustering
approaches. Shahzad et al. [11] conducted an
exploratory study on the vulnerabilities disclosed from
1988 to 2011. In this regard, they investigated the
following seven dimensions: (1) phases in the life
cycle of vulnerabilities, (2) evolution of vulnerabilities
over the years, (3) functionality of vulnerabilities, (4)
access requirements for exploitation of vulnerabilities,
(5) risk level of vulnerabilities, (6) software vendors,
and (7) software products. The results indicated that
the number of reported vulnerabilities did not increase
since the year 2008. Moreover, the most exploited
vulnerabilities included buffer overflow, DDOS, and
privilege escalation. Huang et al. [12] performed text
clustering of vulnerabilities obtained from the National
Vulnerability Database (NVD). They applied a cluster
overlap index in order to evaluate simple K-means,
bisecting K-means, and batchsom clustering algorithms.
In addition, they analyzed dimensions such as the
vulnerability location, causes, and exploit effects.
2.2. Matching approaches
Umezawa et al. [13] proposed a threat analysis
approach that uses data from vulnerability databases
as well as system design information. Initially,
they generated attack trees in order to calculate
the probability that a safety incident would occur.
Furthermore, they generated a set of keywords
according to the attack trees and matched them to
entries from the vulnerability databases. The results
showed that the approach could identify up to 20
vulnerabilities, including the exact matches. With this
in mind, Gegick et al. [14] developed a similar approach
for matching the attack patterns to vulnerabilities during
the design phase. In comparison to the previous
approach, they applied regular expressions in order to
encapsulate the steps from the attack trees. These are
then later matched to vulnerabilities that are extracted
from four different databases. The results showed
that applying this matching technique can increase
security awareness early in the software development
lifecycle. Dong et al. [15] introduced an approach to
detect the inconsistent information between entries from
the NVD, unstructured CVE entries, and vulnerability
reports. This was achieved by extracting vulnerable
software names and versions, and then comparing it to
other entries through the application of the ground-truth
evaluation. The results showed that the approach is
highly accurate and that the presence of inconsistent
vulnerable software versions is significant. Pham et al.
[16] proposed a tool to detect recurring vulnerabilities
on systems that reuse the source code or software
libraries. The tool applies two different techniques
for modeling and matching vulnerable code segments
across different systems. The results demonstrated that
the approach managed to identify vulnerabilities with
high accuracy as well as to report potential issues that
received no fixes or patches. With that said, none of
the aforementioned approaches considered DCs as a
data source. The data that they utilized includes source
code files and various vulnerability databases. However,
we consider real software library data extracted from
different machines that are stored as DIs.
3. Data sources
In the following section, we present the data sources
employed by the proposed framework. These include
the NVD (National Vulnerability Database) and Vulners
for CVE data acquisition, and DIs for gathering software
library-related data.
3.1. CVE dataset
In order to determine the most suitable data sources
for acquisition of the vulnerability data, we considered
the sources described in the taxonomy proposed by
Sauerwein et al. [17]. As a result, the following
two vulnerability data sources were used: NVD [18]
and Vulners [19]. The NVD is the most commonly
used vulnerability database among researchers and
practitioners. It is managed by the U.S. government, and
it contains security checklist references, security-related
software flaws, misconfigurations, product names, and
impact metrics. It provides a structured data set that
can be accessed via an API. On the other hand, Vulners
is a vulnerability assessment platform specializing in
the representation of vulnerability data. Similar to the
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NVD, it provides API access through a Python wrapper.
The main difference between these two databases is
that Vulners also includes zero-day vulnerabilities that
get published as soon as they are reported by the
community.
The data was extracted from both of the
aforementioned databases using customized
data-extraction adapters and stored in the local
database. The data consisted of 122.364 CVEs related
to 48.833 different software libraries. The CVE dataset
was split into two parts: training set and test set. The
training dataset was used for populating and training
the data model. On the other hand, the test dataset was
used to verify the predictions generated by the trained
model. More precisely, the exact split consisted of 80%
(103246 CVEs) for the training dataset and 20% (20649
CVEs)for the test dataset. The 80/20 split was chosen
as it provides a high number of data for training the
model, thereby allowing it to make quality predictions.
Furthermore, it also ensures that there is enough data
available that can be used for result verification. The
training data was further split into 62.5% of our training
data (50% of total data) for populating the model, while
the remaining 37.5% (20% of the total data) was used
for adjusting the weights of the model.
3.2. Docker Images dataset
Besides the CVE data, the framework also utilizes
software library-related information. This data
was gathered from various DIs obtained from the
DockerHub [20]. The reason behind this is that we
were able to quickly gather the large number of data
on vulnerable software libraries that are installed on
Debian systems. The library is considered vulnerable
if it matches the name and version of a library reported
in the CVE database. With that said, the images
were gathered using specific tags, which were used
to search the DockerHub. The extracted information
included the name, version, and a brief description
of the software. The two tags that were applied
are ”vulnerable” and ”debian”. The packet manager
that was used for obtaining the library data was only
applicable to debian-based systems. As a result, other
systems were not considered. The library data obtained
from the machines identified using the ”vulnerable”
tag was used for the population of the model. This
allowed the retrieval of a high number of vulnerable
libraries. In addition, it also increased the possibility
of having multiple vulnerable libraries on the same
machine allowing us to better train the model using
more data. On the other hand, the library data obtained
from the machines identified using the ”debian” tag was
applied in the evaluation. The exact numbers regarding
the DIs dataset can be found in Table 1.
Tag Docker img Img /w library info Img /w vulns
Vulnerable 116 115 86
Debian 1054 360 359
Table 1: Docker images dataset
4. Framework
The VULNERLIZER is composed of the following
three main components that operate together: CVE
Downloader, Docker Image Analyzer and Library
Cohesion Graph Generator (see Figure 1). In this
section, we describe each component in more detail as
well as the proposed approach.
4.1. CVE Downloader
The CVE Downloader module instantiates a
MariaDB database and stores the data obtained from
NVD and Vulners (see Section 3.1). For the extraction
of the CVE data from the Vulners, an API wrapper for
Python was used. On the other hand, the data from NVD
was gathered using a simple http request. As a result,
a compressed file that consists of CVE data within a
specific time frame was retrieved. This data was then
extracted, cleaned, merged, and parsed into the database
format.
4.2. Docker Image Analyzer
Docker Image Analyzer component conducts an
analysis using DIs in order to extract vulnerable
libraries. During the search, the goal was also to gather
older images as they might be affected by multiple
vulnerabilities, thereby allowing us to build a good
training set. We gathered 1250 images in total that
were used in the generation of the Library Cohesion
Graph. Unfortunately, it was not possible to add more
DIs to the set due to the large image processing time.
In the following phase, each of the gathered images
is analyzed using the AWS EC2 machines. Once all
the machines are started, a FCFS (First Come First
Served) approach is applied in order to distribute the
images from the previously gathered list to the different
machines. The dpkg packet manager is used to get
information regarding the installed software libraries,
including its name and version. This data is then stored
locally for further analysis. Once all the data is acquired,
each library is matched with the records from the local
database to determine whether it is vulnerable.
4.3. Vulnerability Clustering
In order to gain insights regarding the obtained
vulnerabilities and libraries, clustering algorithms were
applied. In this regard, we used K-means as a
centroid-based algorithm and Density-Based Spatial
Clustering of Applications with Noise (DBSCAN) as a
density-based algorithm. These were chosen because
they are able to cover various cluster sizes. The
vulnerability and software library data from the local
database is used as an input for clustering. However,
it is necessary to parse it into the correct input format
by normalizing numerical values and encoding textual






































Figure 1: Architecture of the VULNERLIZER
Topics
Topic No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10





















Word 1 sql service xss php unspecified servers earlier windows dot buffer
Word 2 injection denial scripting parameter vectors android acrobat server files overflow
Word 3 commands cause cross inclusion oracle the adobe microsoft directory code
Word 4 execute memory site url unknown information reader r2 traversal execute
Word 5 parameter crash html remote affect sensitive exploitation vulnerability read based
Table 2: Most impactful words per topic from the model
also provides an option to reduce the number of feature
dimensions that are used for clustering. This is
implemented by applying principle component analysis
(PCA) on the feature set of all entries to reduce the
dimension to a specified value. This cancels the effect
of overfitting the clustering model. The K-means
algorithm resulted in 5 to 6 centroids depending on the
feature set and permutation being used.
To augment the feature set that can be used for
clustering, a natural language processing approach is
applied to the descriptions of the CVE dataset. This is
done in order to identify various topics in the description
of the CVEs, which can be used as an additional
input for the clustering algorithms. The approach
that was used for topic modeling is a Non-negative
Matrix factorization (NMF). Using that approach, it was
possible to quickly iterate over the CVE dataset and
obtain a large set of different topics. The module is able
to parse, clean and tokenize each CVE description. The
results showed that by using 10 topics, it was possible
to cover a majority of relevant vulnerability groups.
Table 2 demonstrates the results of the topic modeling
approach with a set number of 10 topics, wherein the
top five most impactful keywords per topic are shown.
These were manually assigned and can be seen in the
category row.
4.4. Library Cohesion Graph Generator
The Library Cohesion Graph Generator represents
the core component of the VULNERLIZER. It serves
to make predictions regarding vulnerable libraries based
on the relation to the library that was used as an input.
4.4.1. Architecture The architecture of the Library
Cohesion Graph is similar to the traditional graph
with weighted undirectional edges. Each node stores
software library-related information. It contains the
following data: the name of the library, the number of
times a given library was affected by a vulnerability
from the CVE dataset, the number of times a library was
identified as vulnerable on a machine from the Docker
Image Analysis (DIA) component, the time between
all reported vulnerabilities for a particular library and,
clusters of CVEs that affect this library. Each edge
stores information regarding the relationship between
the two libraries, where each library represents a node,
and they are connected with this edge. They contain the
following data: the number of times the start and end
node libraries are affected by the same CVE, the number
of times the two libraries were identified as vulnerable
on the same machine in the DIA and the set of weights
that are unique for every edge.
The aforementioned weights are used to calculate a
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cohesion score based on the sum of weighted sub-scores.
The weighted sum of the scores is then computed and
wrapped by a sigmoid function, which is a standard
activation function applied for predicting the probability.
The result approximates the possibility of another
library being vulnerable based on the input CVE. The
sigmoid activation function was used because it allows
the use of backpropagation with the gradient descent
approach to automatically fine tune the individual
weights of each edge. As a result, the accuracy of
predictions was increased. The training approach used
for training the data model is described in Section 4.4.4.
In the following, we provide detailed explanations
regarding the equations and notations used to calculate
the individual scores. In Equation 1, the CV Eedge
represents the number of times a CVE entry was
assigned to this particular edge. The CV Estart and
CV Eend was obtained using the same procedure with
the difference of employing the start and the end node
instead of an edge. The cve score was calculated by
taking the number of occurrences of both libraries in
the same CVE and dividing it by the average number of






In Equation 2, the machineedge marks the number
of times that the library on a certain edge was identified
as vulnerable on a specific machine. We calculated the
machine score similar to the cve score by replacing






In Equation 3, the Clnodei is the set of clusters
assigned to the specific node, where s stands for start
node and e for the end node of the current edge at
the cluster index i. The cluster score is computed by
calculating the overlap between each cluster between
the start and end node, and then dividing it by the total
number of cluster assignments. By doing this, it is
possible to calculate a score that represents the average














For Equation 4, the cluster match score is
calculated by determining how often the assigned cluster
of the new vulnerability was assigned to the start and
end node. This is then divided by the sum of all assigned
clusters. Hence, it is possible to represent the percentage
of the cluster for the new vulnerability compared to the
total number of assigned clusters for the libraries of the
current edge.







In Equation 5, time score is determined by
calculating the difference between the average time of
vulnerabilities of the target node and the time since
the last vulnerability was reported for this node. This
is then divided by the highest reported time between
the vulnerabilities of the target node. This allows the
calculation of the score that determines whether the
input vulnerability fits in the historical time data of the
target node. With this in mind, avg timetar−∗−get
represents the average time between reported CVEs on
the target library and times between vulnerbaletarget
denotes the list of times between reported CVEs for the
target library.
time score = avg time
target−time since last
max(times between vulnerabletarget) (5)
Equation 6 calculates the sum of all individual scores
with their corresponding weight and uses the sigmoid
function as an activation function to determine the
activation value of the edge. The higher the activation




i=0 weighti ∗ scorei)
(6)
The information regarding the new vulnerability,
including the assigned cluster and timestamp, are not
stored in the model. However, this will be used to
predict potential vulnerable libraries based on the input
library or the CVE entry. An example of the cohesion
































Figure 2: Example of the Cohesion model with two
nodes
4.4.2. Population of the model The population of
the model was conducted using a portion of the training
data set. In this regard, we iterate over each CVE entry
in the dataset and record whether a certain library was
affected by it. In addition, we also check which of
the other libraries are also affected by this particular
CVE. This is done in order to determine if there is
a connection between the two library nodes. The
resulting data is then stored in the model by adding
the corresponding nodes. If the node already exists,
the occurrence count for the library is increased. The
same procedure is conducted with the edges. If the
combination of the libraries has not been recorded,
a new edge between the two corresponding nodes is
created. Otherwise, the number of occurrences on the
specific edge is increased. An additional method for
populating the model involves using the data acquired
from the DIA. This data identifies the relations between
vulnerable software libraries on the same machine, as
well as the occurrence of a library being identified as
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vulnerable on any machine. With the provided tag,
the module will automatically read the data and use
it for the population of the model. Finally, the last
input for the cohesion graph is the result of the cluster
analysis. This is achieved by adding each cluster of
CVE entries to the library nodes affected by these CVEs.
The information is stored as a dictionary in the library
nodes. It indicates how many CVEs from a specific
cluster affected a particular software library.
4.4.3. Prediction of vulnerable libraries The main
goal of the VULNERLIZER is to conduct an analysis
between software libraries and vulnerabilities. In order
to achieve this, individual scores were calculated first, as
previously mentioned in Section 4.4.1. In the following
step, a weighted sum of these individual scores was
computed. The accumulated score is then fed to an
activation function that yields the activation of a given
edge between the two libraries in regards to the target
library being vulnerable. In order to predict all libraries
that might be vulnerable based on a certain library or a
CVE entry, we check the library nodes that are affected.
Since the input does not have an assigned cluster, we
use the clustering algorithm to assign this new entry
to a cluster in order to make future predictions. Then,
we calculate each activation for all the edges that are
connected to the initial library node. Consequently, it
is possible to see if the activation exceeds a defined
threshold. In case the threshold is lower than the
activation of the current edge, the library that is
connected to the initial node using that particular edge
is added to the list of potentially vulnerable libraries.
Once all the edges connected to the initial node are
analyzed, the same analysis is conducted starting from
the nodes that are stored in the list of potential libraries.
The depth of this look-up approach can be adjusted
according to the defined threshold. This is repeated until
the given depth is reached or no new potential libraries
are added to the final result. By applying this procedure,
we wanted to predict libraries that could potentially be
vulnerable because they are related to the library that is
used as an input or a CVE entry.
4.4.4. Training In order to increase the accuracy of
predictions of the model, the training of the Library
Cohesion Graph was conducted using 37.5% of the
total training data set. This procedure is similar to the
one employed by neural networks. In this regard, a
gradient descent approach was used to minimize the
loss function for the predictions. This is achieved by
applying backpropagation, wherein the weights on the
individual edges between library nodes are adjusted.
The alteration is based on the result of the current
prediction. Furthermore, the data in the form of CVE
entries with all the supplementary information is used as
an input for the clustering algorithms. In addition to the
selected features, the date of the publication of the CVE
entry is appended as well. This is significant because it
allows the calculation of the time score from Equation
5.
A CVE is eligible as an input case for training of the
model in case there is at least one other CVE that exists
with a publishing date that is later than the publishing
date of the input CVE. For this reason, it is possible for
the model to identify potential targets. In the first step,
the database is scanned for libraries that are affected by
the CVE that was published in the next n days after
the initial CVE. For example, the n value can be set to
zero, which would result in the model being trained to
find vulnerabilities that occur on the same day as the
input CVE. Another example would be to set the n to a
higher value. This would adapt the model to incorporate
vulnerabilities that will occur up to n days after the
initial input CVE. The found libraries are then stored as
target libraries for the initial CVE of this training case.
This means that when the initial CVE is used as an input
for a prediction, a prediction is considered correct if the
predicted library is in the target list of the input CVE.
The CVE entries with target lists are then generated for
each CVE entry in the training set and stored for the
training process. For the training of the model itself,
we iterate over the training dataset that contains CVE
and the target combinations to generate predictions of
potentially vulnerable libraries. These predictions are
based on the current weights on the edges between the
initial library from the CVE and target libraries. In
the following step, the prediction is evaluated with a
loss function to determine the prediction loss. This is
shown in Equation 7. In this regard, we iterate over
each entry in the CVE training dataset and repeat the
aforementioned procedure for 50 iterations. This is
done in order to optimize the weights per edge. The
number of iterations can be customized depending on
the available resources, such as computing power and
time. As a result, each iteration adjusts the individual
weights to reduce the loss function and increase the
accuracy of the model.
loss =
{
1− prediction, if target is vulnerable
1 + prediction, otherwise
(7)
5. Evaluation
In the following section, we provide an evaluation
of the data model in order to evaluate its effectiveness.
We first discuss the method that was applied and its role
in verifying the data model. Afterwards, we present the
results of the analysis.
5.1. Method
The approach used for the evaluation of the model
verifies the predictions using the CVE test dataset. The
test dataset was prepared using the same methodology
that was applied in the preparation of the training
dataset. This is done in order to generate a list of target
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libraries for each CVE entry in the test dataset. Based on
the target list, predictions are made for each CVE entry
in this set. By doing this, it is possible to determine
which libraries could potentially be vulnerable. A
library is defined as vulnerable for a specific input case if
there exists a CVE related to this library that is published
after the CVE that was used as the input for this
prediction. In order to cover a wide variety of factors
that might influence the accuracy of the predictions,
we ran different permutations of factors that could
potentially have the highest impact on the predictions.
In addition, we compared them in order to identify if
some of these factors have a higher influence on the
predictions compared to the others. Consequently, we
first defined seven feature sets that were used for the
clustering approach in the training and testing of the
model. These feature sets contain dimensions from the
CVE datatables 1. Furthermore, it is also stated whether
the topic modeling approach was applied for clustering.
The analysis was performed using each feature set for
different permutations of the data model. This is done
in order to compare them to each other in terms of the
achieved accuracy. In the following, we provide a brief
description of each permutation:
Default permutation represents the base from which
all the other adaptations were made. It uses the full
dimension of the feature vector for clustering, wherein
the topic modeling was set to work with 10 unique
topics. Furthermore, it utilizes only the topic with
the highest matching score as an input for clustering.
This means there is only one input from the topic
modeling that represents one topic assigned to the
CVE. Finally, the training of the model was set to run
for 50 iterations, while the input tag for populating
the model with the libraries from DIs was set to
”vulnerable”. NoTraining permutation is similar to the
default permutation. However, it did not use the training
part of the data model. This means that all weights
are set to their initial value of one. As a result, each
sub-score is weighted the same for the cohesion score
and the activation of an edge. This permutation was
used to verify if the implemented training approach in
the data model increases the accuracy of the model’s
predictions. 20Topics permutation utilizes a different
number of topics for the topic modeling approach.
Instead of using 10 topics, 20 topics were applied.
This investigates whether the number of used topics
has a significant impact on the accuracy of predictions.
Multiple topics permutation uses topic modeling as a
feature for clustering in a different fashion. Instead of
using a single topic with the highest correlation value,
the correlation value for each topic was applied. This
means that the number of dimensions of the feature
vector for clustering was increased by nine. Using
that permutation, it is possible to test whether the topic
modeling performs better with a single assigned topic
per vulnerability compared to the correlation values
1https://bit.ly/vulnerlizer
for all the topics. 1dimension permutation uses the
dimension reduction feature of the VULNERLIZER.
This reduces the number of dimensions of the feature
vector used for clustering to one dimension. As a
result, it is possible to check if the default permutation
created issues, such as overfitting in the clustering of
vulnerabilities. Lessepochs permutation uses the lower
number of iterations for the training of the model.
Instead of 50, 20 iterations were used. This verifies
whether the number of iterations used for training the
model has an impact on the final accuracy or not.
Debian permutation uses the ”debian” tag instead of
the ”vulnerable” tag for the population of the graph in
regards to the software library data obtained from DIs.
This determines if the source data from the DIA has any
impact on the accuracy.
5.2. Evaluation based on CVEs
In order to further prepare the data for evaluation,
it was necessary to iterate over all CVE entries in the
dataset and assign each entry an ID for one of the
clusters from the training process. Moreover, a target
library list was assigned to each CVE entry by looking
at subsequent CVEs of the input CVE. This was done in
the same way as the preparation of the training dataset.
In this case, we considered a library as a target if it
was affected by a CVE within 45 days of publication
of the initial input CVE. The 45 days were chosen
since this time period was considered broad enough to
evaluate the performance of the model in regards to
predicting the libraries that could become vulnerable
after the report of a new CVE. Afterwards, this data
was used for model verification by feeding each initial
CVE into the model and comparing the generated list
of potentially vulnerable libraries with the target list
of the CVE. We rated a prediction as correct if the
predicted library was part of the target list and as false
if the prediction was not part of the list. The average
accuracy ( correct predictionsall predictions ) was built using all CVEs in
the test run. Using that approach, it is possible to verify
the accuracy of the generated predictions. However,
it is not possible to strictly assign a relation between
the CVEs. For this reason, there is a chance that not
all of the related CVEs are predicted. Nevertheless,
the accuracy was more important than predicting every
possible library in regards to the libraries that might be
potentially vulnerable.
Furthermore, if the verification data does not contain
a library represented by a node in the model, it would
be dropped from the evaluation. In this case, it is
possible that a newly reported vulnerability was related
to a library that was not found during the analysis.
Therefore, we are not able to make predictions for these
specific test cases. As a result, they are omitted from
the evaluation. This reduced the number of possible test
cases per permutation to an average of 19900 test cases.
In all permutation / feature set combinations, except for
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the permutation without the training, the accuracy trend
based on the given threshold followed the same pattern.
The accuracy values for predictions with a threshold of
0 were the lowest for the whole dataset, whereby all
edges were used for predictions. On the other hand,
the accuracy values were higher for a threshold of 0.1
or higher. While the initial jump in the accuracy from
a threshold of 0 to 0.1 was the highest with an average
increase by 24.5%, further increases in the threshold did
not yield larger differences in the accuracy values. The
default permutation is shown in Table 3, in which the
feature set that resulted in the highest average accuracy
was used.
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Figure 3: Trend of accuracy based on threshold
In regards to all permutations, the threshold of 0.9
had the highest prediction accuracy. This was expected
because the higher threshold reduces the number of
activated edges, which yields a lower number of false
predictions for the input library. However, most of
the correct predictions are retained because the weights
were adjusted due to the training of the model. As
a result, a higher activation on historically correct
predictions was generated.
5.2.1. Evaluation using different permutations
Figure 4 displays the comparison between accuracies
over the different permutations. Each boxplot displays
all accuracies for 19900 test cases for the given
permutation. The threshold of 0.9 was chosen each time
as it had the best resulting accuracy for all permutations
and feature set combinations. In addition, the feature
set that performed the best was selected for the given
permutation. The x axis of the graph shows the
combination <permutation> - <feature set>. It can be
seen that compared to the noTraining and the default
permutation, the training of the model increased the
median accuracy of the predictions by 21.68% (from
45.4% to 67.1%). The other permutations, except for the
debian permutation, resulted in similar median accuracy
values. However, in the non-default permutations, the
distribution of the accuracy values is shifted slightly
to the lower ranges. Similarly, the debian permutation
resulted in lower accuracy for all the data points. On
the other hand, the default permutation was the best
performing one. Generally, the changes in permutations
slightly decreased the accuracy of predictions. This can
be seen from the data displayed in Figure 4, wherein
the median accuracy remains the same. On the other
hand, there are more data points in the lower accuracy
range for the other permutations. This proves that the
values chosen for the default permutation are better
than the altered ones used in the other permutations.
According to the results, most of the data is located
around the mean accuracy. However, each permutation
has some outliers that are lower than the minimum
accuracy in the respective boxplot. Therefore, we
analyzed the accuracy with regards to the number of
predicted vulnerable libraries per test CVE. For this
purpose, we build the average accuracy values of all test
cases with the same number of predicted libraries. The
purpose of this is to see the accuracy distribution based
on the number of predicted libraries per new CVE.
This indicates whether the model is able to predict a
high number of libraries with confidence. We used this
approach to check if we can identify the outliers below















































Figure 4: Accuracies for permutations with best
performing feature set <permutation> - <feature set>
5.2.2. Evaluation using the best feature set Figure
5 demonstrates the number of predictions made per
CVE per permutation using the best set. The best
set is defined as the feature set where the highest
accuracy values are achieved per permutation. The red
line indicates the average accuracy for the number of
predicted libraries per CVE. We decided to cap the range
on the x axis at 60 because only a small number of
permutations had more than 60 test cases. These did
not often occur though, which is why we consider them
as outliers and ignore them in order to enhance the
readability of the graphs. According to the chart, the
model had a good performance when predicting up to
43 libraries per input CVE. From 43 predicted libraries
onwards, the accuracy of predictions drops together with
the number of predictions due to the outliers. This
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is true for each permutation except for the NoTraining
permutation. In this case, the average accuracy of
predictions has multiple drops in relation to the total
number of predictions (y-axis) per CVE. Furthermore,
these drops appear earlier compared to the other
permutations. Another observation is that there are more
peaks for the specific numbers of predictions per CVE.
In relation to other permutations, the distribution of the
occurrences of specific numbers of predictions per CVE
is distributed better over the displayed range. This is
probably due to the missing adjustments of weights for
these permutations. This indicates that the trained model
is able to find more potentially vulnerable libraries
compared to the model without training. The training
of the model allows reinforcing connections between
libraries that are related and weakening connections for
non-related libraries.
An example of a trained permutation is the Debian
permutation, where the average accuracy results range
from 14 to 19 predictions per initial input. This is lower
compared to the other permutation sets. Moreover, the
number of test cases in which the number of predictions
was between 13 and 19 per input CVE is also lower in
the Debian permutation. This is probably due to the
lower average number of identified vulnerable libraries
on the machines with the ”debian” tag (see Table 1)
compared to the machines with the ”vulnerable” tag
from the DIA. In addition, this permutation resulted in a
shift of the number of correctly predicted libraries to the
right side. This means that a higher number of libraries
is predicted more often. Due to the lower accuracy
in the Debian permutation for the test cases with the
lower number of predictions, the overall accuracy for
this permutation is noticeably lower as one can see in
Figure 4. This is due to the lower number of identified
vulnerabilities per machine in the DIA. Furthermore,
the average accuracy when the number of predictions
from the model is low varies stronger between each
permutation. This is not the case when the model
is predicting more libraries. As a result, the model
performs best when predicting multiple libraries (see
Figure 5). This is due to the initial node being well
connected within the model. Therefore, the accuracy is
higher because more information is available. Having
a high number of test cases where the number of
predictions per CVE is low, can be justified by the fact
that some entry nodes might not be fully connected
within the graph. This is the case because the data that
was used for the population and training was not linked
to any node due to the missing relations obtained from
analyzing the datasets. This issue could be addressed by
collecting additional DI data and extracting additional
software libraries.
5.3. Threats to validity
Throughout the development and evaluation of the
VULNERLIZER, we considered possible threats to
validity. The approach in which the data is extracted
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Figure 5: Accuracy and number of predictions based on
correctly predicted libraries
from the DIs could be subjective. The packet manager
that was used is intended to work only for OSs that
are debian-based. As a result, the other OS types
were not considered. Furthermore, the image search
was conducted using only two different tags. However,
we were still able to obtain a high number of data
for training and testing of the model. Moreover, the
obtained CVE data might not always be up-to-date. This
means that the data is as actual as its source. As a
result, there might be relevant vulnerabilities that are
published after the data gathering is completed. In
order to mitigate this issue, the tool updates the database
and checks if there are new vulnerabilities each time it
is run. Finally, the quality of the descriptions in the
CVE data that is used for the topic modeling might
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be questionable. This relates especially to the newest
entries, as they might not have the full description yet.
Furthermore, it is worth noting that the descriptions
do not need to follow fixed guidelines, and they are
written by many different security experts. Thus, CVE
descriptions can range from very detailed ones to the
ones that are empty. In order to minimize this threat, we
considered multiple data sources. In addition, the CVEs
with an empty description have a unique topic assigned
to them.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a novel approach
for cross-analysis between vulnerabilities and software
libraries. The approach uses CVE and software
library data in combination with clustering algorithms
to generate links between vulnerabilities and libraries.
In addition, the training of the model is conducted in
order to reevaluate the generated links. Finally, the
predictions are made using the CVE data from the test
set. The results indicate that the VULNERLIZER has
the potential to predict future vulnerable libraries based
on an initial CVE entry or a software library. The trained
model performed best in cases when a high number of
predictions was made, which resulted in an accuracy of
75% or higher. The overall approach could be integrated
into secure life cycle of IT companies in order to check
if some of the dependencies they use are vulnerable.
Future work involves the consideration of other data
sources, such as the network data and the data from Git
repositories. Furthermore, we plan to apply additional
data training methods to improve the model further, as
well as to apply this approach to different OSs.
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